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Abstract
Past approaches to food security in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were informed by concerns about food
availability. They aimed at domestic self-sufficiency and self-sufficiency by proxy (via farmland investments abroad). These
strategies have failed. Water scarcity at home increasingly compromises agricultural production. Farmland investments abroad
have not matched ambitious related announcements due to a complex mixture of commercial, socio-economic and political
factors. They do not contribute meaningful quantities to the Gulf countries’ food imports. The failure of such strategies has
prompted a shift of focus instead towards value chain management as a means to secure food availability. Rather than trying to
fight food import dependence, the Gulf countries now accept and manage it. However, malnutrition that leads to high levels of
obesity and diabetes constitutes a risk factor in the face of COVID-19. Food accessibility for vulnerable population segments
such as migrant labour is another issue that requires yet further policy measures, such as safety nets –whose expansion would be
politically controversial if not impossible, however.
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1 Introduction
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the
largest importer of cereals globally. Its imports of poultry
and dairy products are extensive as well. Only with regard to
fruit and vegetables do some countries of the region have a
meaningful degree of self-sufficiency, or are even net ex-
porters – such as Turkey and Morocco. The vulnerability to
import disruptions is most acutely felt in the arid Gulf region
that is rich in oil but poor in water and agricultural potential.
To alleviate such fears, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) expanded local food production with the help
of unsustainable mining of fossil water after the world food
crisis of 1972–1975. By the time of the global food crisis of
2007/8 this strategy had run its course, as aquifers ran dry.
This time, the Gulf countries rushed to secure privileged bi-
lateral access to food production abroad. Large farmland
investments were announced, often in food-insecure countries
such as Ethiopia and Sudan.
The COVID-19 crisis and its impact on global food sys-
tems is an opportunity to revisit these past approaches to food
security. The Gulf countries have barked up the wrong tree.
Neither domestic self-sufficiency nor self-sufficiency by
proxy (i.e. farmland abroad) are the main challenges, rather
the management of value chains, food diplomacy to ensure the
functionality of multilateral frameworks, tacklingmalnutrition
and its consequences (e.g. obesity) and ensuring food acces-
sibility for vulnerable segments of the population – such as
migrant labour and people with insecure residency statuses.
2 Self-sufficiency and land investments
as failed strategies
TheMENA region lost its ability to grow its required amounts of
food from domestic renewable water resources in the 1970s al-
ready and has increasingly come to rely on food trade (Allan
2003). There is unease with this growing dependency, which
can be explained by a number of negative historic experiences:
the difficult food supply situation in World War II, the
politicisation of food trade by the United States in the 1960s
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and 1970s when it used subsidised Public Law 480 food exports
for political leverage, the same country’s threat of a food embargo
in retaliation for the Arab oil boycott and, more recently, sanction
regimes like that of the United Nations in Iraq from 1990 to 2003
that wreaked havoc on food security in the latter country.
There are also intellectual arguments for a degree of self-
sufficiency that run counter to the trade-based approach to
food security that is advocated by economic liberalism and
international organisations such as the World Bank.
Countries that have limited purchasing power, rely on volatile
export earnings, depend on a main staple food that is con-
trolled by only a few suppliers (e.g. rice), or are at risk of
sanctions, war and/or geopolitical supply disruptions might
benefit from reducing their exposure to volatile international
markets. Finally, heavy reliance on imported calories is sim-
ply not an option for vast countries such as China and India
because of their sheer size in comparison to exportable sur-
pluses elsewhere (Clapp 2017).
Gulf self-sufficiency aspirations are understandable, but
have clashed with the realities of resource constraints and
population growth. Agricultural subsidies made Saudi
Arabia the world’s sixth-largest exporter of wheat in the
1990s, but it had to phase out production between 2008 and
2016 for lack of water. Domestic agricultural aspirations now-
adays confine themselves to the water-efficient cultivation of
fruit and vegetables in greenhouses and vertical farms as well
as livestock-raising with imported fodder – not the grandiose
self-sufficiency visions of yesteryears.
Farmland investment abroad, the self-sufficiency by proxy
strategy, has failed as well. Announcements were grandiose
and quickly became part of a media narrative about the Gulf
countries buying up Africa and other developing countries.
But implementation lagged behind, mimicking the failure of
a similar plan in the 1970s to develop Sudan into an Arab
bread basket (Woertz 2013). Lack of infrastructure, a chal-
lenging local business environment, missing expertise on the
part of the Gulf countries, resistance by disenfranchised
holders of customary land rights and reduced fiscal space to
invest as a result of falling oil prices all took their toll. The
farmland-investment wave has not made its mark in the food-
trade statistics over a decade after its launch: The Gulf coun-
tries continue to receive the vast majority of their imported
food from established agro exporters, among them a growing
number from tropical regions such as Brazil. Major target
countries of land investments in the developing world such
as Sudan hardly figure meanwhile (International Trade Center
2020; Woertz and Keulertz 2015).
3 Management of value chains
If the Gulf countries did actually put money on the table it was
mostly in developed agro markets and investments were in
food-trade value chains rather than further upstream in farm-
land. Saudi state-owned SALIC, for example, teamed up with
international grain-trader Bunge to purchase a majority stake
in the privatised Canadian Wheat Board. The Gulf countries
themselves are home to modern value chains in food process-
ing and distribution. Gulf capitalists play an influential role in
such modern value chains in other MENA countries, too, op-
erating via large conglomerates such as Kuwait-based
Americana and Saudi Arabia-based Savola (Hanieh 2018).
The impact of COVID-19 will most likely be most
severe in traditional and transitional food value chains,
such as household microenterprises on the one hand and
small and medium-sized enterprises and wet markets on
the other (Reardon et al. 2020). Informal and labour-in-
tensive, they bring together large numbers of workers in
crowded spaces – at considerable risk of contagion and
with ensuing shutdowns and labour shortages. The
capital-intensive farming of staple crops will be less af-
fected in comparison. The labour-intensive cultivation of
fruit and vegetables will likely fare better as well, as it is
subject to less labour density than the traditional and tran-
sitional downstream value chains. This all means that the
Gulf countries find themselves in a relatively privileged
position: their global supplies of agricultural products are
unlikely to dry up in the foreseeable future, while their
modern food value chains that are dominated by super-
markets and capital-intensive processing plants are less
vulnerable to COVID-19-related disruptions.
Much of their reaction has already focussed on the man-
agement of value chains and their international linkages. They
have increased storage to bridge supply shortfalls, diversified
providers, streamlined sanitation measures and eased import
flows by changing the requirement for all goods to be labelled
in Arabic. Internationally, stocks of staple foods are higher
and markets better supplied than during the global food crisis
of 2007/08. Some food exporters such as Ukraine and
Vietnam have announced quotas, but price spikes and outright
export restrictions have not occurred so far. Political aware-
ness about the detrimental effects of such restrictions has
grown meanwhile.
Multilateral initiatives such as the Agricultural Markets
Information System (AMIS) have sought to increase market
transparency and dampen food-price volatility. Such initia-
tives could also help to limit national rushes to beef-up phys-
ical storage, which might create the very problem that they
wish to address: illiquid food markets (von Braun et al. 2009).
The Gulf countries may consider raising their concerns as well
in multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organization
and the G20, not unlike the group of the Net Food-Importing
Developing Countries (NFIDC) that formed an interest group
within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotia-
tions during the Uruguay round to lobby for affordable food
imports (Narlikar 2003).
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4 Food accessibility and malnutrition
In contrast to the global food crisis, a renewed wave of an-
nounced land investments is not likely. The strategy has not
brought benefits and plummeting oil prices mean that there is
less capital available for adventurous investment deals.
Securing food focusses now on the management of value
chains, where the Gulf countries are in a relatively privileged
position as a result of their modern food systems. As before,
food availability is not the primary issue – having proven to be
manageable.
However, COVID-19 has turned the spotlight onto issues
of food accessibility and malnutrition. The Gulf countries
have one of the largest per capita shares worldwide of people
suffering from diabetes and obesity, two groups particularly at
risk of succumbing to COVID-19. Authorities have been re-
luctant to address underlying issues more forcefully, such as
sedentary lifestyles and diets rich in sugar, fat and carbohy-
drates (Alnohair 2014). The obesity epidemic, which is par-
ticularly prevalent among females, highlights that food secu-
rity is rarely an issue of lacking calories, rather of insufficient
micronutrients. This also shows in other phenomena related to
nutrition insecurity. The percentage of children in the Gulf
with stunted growth is smaller than elsewhere in the MENA
region, but still in the higher single digits in Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and Oman (Breisinger et al. 2012).
Food accessibility can also be compromised for vulnerable
segments of the population, namely migrant workers and
those with insecure residency statuses. Migrants make up the
vast majority of the population in the UAE (88%), Qatar
(76%) and Kuwait (74%). In Saudi Arabia and Oman, they
form substantial minorities – being 32% and 41% of the pop-
ulation, respectively. In Bahrain, their population share is 51%
(World Bank 2020). Additionally, there are long-term resi-
dents with unclear residency status – the so-called bidoon
(“without”). In Kuwait and the UAE, they often hail from
local Bedouin populations that were not awarded citizenship
status at the time of independence. In Saudi Arabia, large
shantytowns exist around Mecca, Medina and Jeddah that
are home to descendants of migrants from Africa and
Southeast Asia who came to the country decades ago and
overstayed their visas. Like migrant workers, they form a per-
manent underclass with limited social and legal rights.
COVID-19 is not the great leveller that will affect every-
body equally. The poor are more at risk than the affluent. They
can ill afford to shelter in place, their blue-collar occupations
cannot be conducted from the safety of the home and they do
not have meaningful savings to bridge longer periods of time
without employment and income. Their cramped living quar-
ters constitute an increased risk of contagion and they have
less access to healthcare if they contract the disease.
COVID-19 has brought long-standing grievances in the
Gulf labour sector into sharp relief, such as non- or late
payment of wages, limited rights under the kafala sponsorship
system and poor working conditions (Kamrava and Babar
2012; Rajan 2019). Migrant workers suffer most from the
economic havoc that COVID-19 is wreaking. Current circum-
stances undermine their ability to purchase nutritious food in
adequate quantities. National labour still works predominantly
in the public sector, where it enjoys a degree of protection or
receives relief aid from the government that is only available
for nationals. In the private sector nationals also enjoy more
protection. Saudi Arabia, for example, has decided to pay 60%
of the private sector wages of Saudi nationals for up to three
months as part of its Unemployment Insurance scheme
(SANED). In comparison, the economic impact of COVID-
19 is far more severe for migrant workers. They suffer most
from restrictive measures like quarantines and their access to
relief aid and healthcare is limited.
The recent decision by the Saudi government to open up
the healthcare system to everybody for COVID-19 treatment
regardless of their legal residency status is an implicit ac-
knowledgement that such lack of access can be a public health
risk. Maintaining food security under COVID-19 will require
safety nets that go beyond random charity transfers. The nec-
essary formalisation that goes with that will likely raise con-
cerns. The issue of migration was a sensitive one even before
COVID-19 and tied to debates on demographic imbalances
and political stability. Already there are calls in Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Oman to take the COVID-19 crisis as an opportu-
nity to permanently reduce the share of migrants in the overall
population. The UAE and Qatar have relaxed their flight bans,
allowing outgoing flights to repatriate migrant workers. Many
migrant workers are suffering with regard to food accessibil-
ity, as they find themselves caught between a rock and a hard
place. Either they stay in the host state with no or reduced pay
or they return prematurely to their home countries, with their
limited savings gone and struggling to repay the fees of the
agencies that facilitated their temporary labour migration in
the first place.
5 Conclusion
The food systems of the Arab Gulf countries have so far per-
formed well during the COVID-19 crisis in terms of ensuring
food availability. Their modern value chains are more resilient
than the traditional and transitional ones that dominate in de-
veloping countries. The improvement of such value chains
deserves the attention of policymakers and researchers alike.
Hydroponics, aquaponics, vertical farming and other modern
production technologies might allow the Gulf countries to
meet some of their requirements regarding fruit, vegetables
and fish without depleting groundwater resources at unsus-
tainable rates. However, the vast majority of food supplies
will continue to come from global markets. Multilateral
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frameworks such as the WTO and G20 could help in making
international food trade more dependable, yet the Gulf coun-
tries have not paid enough attention to corresponding food
diplomacy at the respective bodies.
The COVID-19 crisis has also highlighted that food secu-
rity is nutrition security above all else. It could provide an
opportunity for the Gulf countries to tackle food-related epi-
demics such as obesity and diabetes more forcefully. Policy
interventions could range from taxation on and declaration
requirements for carbohydrates and sugar-rich foods to school
meals and awareness campaigns. Food accessibility for mi-
grant workers and other vulnerable segments of the population
is another priority area of concern. It would require improve-
ment of existing labour regulations, assistance programmes
and safety nets. As such, it points to the fraught debates
around long-standing grievances in the labour sector that in-
tersect with concerns about demographic imbalances and
workforce nationalisation – political concerns that dim pros-
pects of reform significantly.
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